Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

edge was a prelude only to his efforts to state the kind of reality to be ascribed to its presuppositions. Understand the conditions of knowledge and we take the first step toward understanding the nature of reality. Kant saw this clearly. In the spirit of this he made the deduction of the categories of the second edition of the *Kritik of Pure Reason* more epistemological and less purely psychological than the deduction of the first edition. But modern writers on the theory of knowledge fail to make the position of their problem, its postulates and its corollaries, clear to us. They have made it fairly distinct from psychology; now we should like to know whether the problem of knowledge is a part of metaphysics, perhaps an adjunct, or a field of enquiry quite distinct in limits and character. Can we discuss the conditions of knowledge without interesting ourselves in the nature of the predicates to be ascribed to the reality of its postulates? If so, then we cannot, as Kern and others so often do, bring in metaphysical considerations through the back door.

ARTHUR S. DEWING.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Das Gedächtnis. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologie und ihre Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung. Von MAX OFFNER. Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1909.—pp. 238.

The author's purpose is to summarize the contributions made during the last twenty years by experimental psychology to our knowledge of memory. As the book is intended primarily for teachers, it contains many applications to pedagogy. The general psychological standpoint of the author is Lippsian with a strong Herbartian flavor. Among the various data discussed the following seem to have especial significance.

Every sensation or perception—according to Offner's somewhat cumbersome terminology—sets up a latent functional disposition for its ideational reinstatement or reproduction which becomes actual by means of associational co-excitations acquired in the course of experience. The only law of association which modern psychology has found to be valid, states that simultaneous mental processes leave behind them a tendency toward subsequent reproduction and a disposition for mutual recall. These two dispositions for recurrence and associational recall may be formed and strengthened even among subliminal excitations as well as among non-contiguous members of a conscious series. In the latter case, the larger the number of intermediate members, the weaker, other things being equal, will be the associational disposition. Progressive associations (*a-b-c*) are, as a rule, stronger than regressive (*c-b-a*). The strength of the dispositions for recurrence and recall may be measured by various experimental methods. This strength is found to be directly proportional to the intensity, duration, attentive vividness, and number of repetitions of the mental processes. The number of repetitions saved in the process of relearning 24 hours after the first learning is, on the average, one of the former to three of the latter. The effect of successive repetitions for memory decreases at first rapidly, later almost imperceptibly. Longer series require relatively much more time and a greater number of repetitions than shorter series. The more the repetitions are distributed over longer periods of time, the more effective do they become for memorizing. If two associations are of equal strength but of different age, the older will profit more by each new repetition than the younger. Again, if the material to be memorized is of uniform difficulty and not of too great length, it is acquired sooner if learned as a whole than if broken up into small units. Unpleasant experiences are more easily remembered than pleasant ones, but learning while in a pleasant frame of mind is much more effective than learning during a depressive mood or during other abnormal physical and mental states. At first the process of forgetting progresses very rapidly, so that after eight hours more than half is lost, while later on, days, months, and years make but little difference in the amount forgotten.

A large section of the book is devoted to reproduction as a motive that induces the actual functioning of the dispositions of recurrence and recall. The reaction time necessary for the reproduction of one mental process by another is on the average .6 sec. It varies greatly, however, with the strength, age, and readiness of the disposition, with the subject's attention, emotion, freshness or fatigue, and age. What particular dispositions are realized in any given case, depends to some extent upon the factors just mentioned, and partly also upon the subject's present mental pre-occupation—for example, a certain task set to him—and his general mental make-up, his memory type, upon sex, and the method of learning. The questions of development, improvement, and decay of memory have not been sufficiently studied to permit of a statement of definite and generalized results. Six pages of bibliography including the most important theoretical and experimental works on memory form a valuable appendix.

L. R. GEISSLER.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Attention and Interest, A Study in Psychology and Education. By FELIX ARNOLD. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1910.—pp. 272.

The purpose of this book is "to clarify and arrange the many facts" brought to light by experimental psychology. Notwithstanding his intentions to be impartial, the author has emphasized the biological or functional point of view. This, however, is natural, as the book seems to be intended primarily for students preparing to teach, while students of pure psychology will find other works on attention more profitable.

The subject-matter of each chapter in the first and second part is treated under the categories 'description,' 'illustration,' 'development,' and 'explanation.' The illustrations consist of quotations from English literature and of directions for short, easy experiments, taken mostly from standard textbooks. The exposition under 'development' and 'explanation' often requires an arbitrary separation of materials closely related. In the first half of the book the text is sometimes unnecessarily crowded with tables, figures, sche-